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ABSTRACT
As Convolutional Neural Networks (CNNs) are increasingly being employed in safety-critical applications, it
is important that they behave reliably in the face of hardware errors. Transient hardware errors may percolate
undesirable state during execution, resulting in software-manifested errors which can adversely affect high-level
decision making. This paper presents HarDNN, a software-directed approach to identify vulnerable computations
during a CNN inference and selectively protect them based on their propensity towards corrupting the inference
output in the presence of a hardware error. We show that HarDNN can accurately estimate relative vulnerability
of a feature map (fmap) in CNNs using a statistical error injection campaign, and explore heuristics for fast
vulnerability assessment. Based on these results, we analyze the tradeoff between error coverage and computational
overhead that the system designers can use to employ selective protection. Results show that the improvement in
resilience for the added computation is superlinear with HarDNN. For example, HarDNN improves SqueezeNet’s
resilience by 10× with just 30% additional computations.
1 INTRODUCTION
CNNs have seen a recent surge in usage across many appli-
cation domains ranging from High Performance Computing
(HPC) to safety-critical systems such as autonomous vehi-
cles and medical devices. We have also seen a rise in the use
of efficient platforms that accelerate CNN executions such
as GPUs and domain-specific accelerators such as the one
deployed in Tesla’s Full Self-Driving (FSD) System (Sze
et al., 2017; NVIDIA; Sean Hollister, 2019). As CNNs con-
tinue to permeate the fabric of everyday life with increasing
utilization in safety-critical applications, it is important that
they are resilient to transient hardware errors (also known
as soft errors).
Studies have shown that hardware errors could have severe
unintended consequences unless the system is designed to
detect these errors (Yoshida, 2013; Safety Research and
Strategies, Inc., 2013). For example, following a series
of unintended acceleration events by Toyota vehicles, a
taskforce following up on a NASA investigation showed
that, “as little as a single bit flip ... could make a car run out
of control.” To mitigate such scenarios, hardware in safety-
critical systems must fulfill high integrity requirements, such
as those outlined in the ISO-26262 standard (International
Organization for Standardization, 2011).
While processors deployed in safety-critical systems will
employ ECC/parity to protect large storage structures (stor-
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ing weights and intermediate data), the level of protection
they offer will likely be not sufficient to meet the stringent
requirements set by standards such as ISO-26262. Conven-
tional reliability solutions, such as full duplication through
hardware or software, suffer from high overheads in cost,
area, power, and/or performance (Iturbe et al., 2016; Bartlett
& Spainhower, 2004; Shye et al., 2009), yet are still com-
monly used in practice to ensure high resilience. For ex-
ample, despite the limited power and area constraints of
real-time systems, Tesla’s FSD system deploys two fully
redundant FSD chips along with accompanying redundant
control logic, power, and peripheral packaging on the board
for reliability.
With the goal of developing a reliability solution that is
much lower cost than full duplication, we seek to under-
stand the underlying vulnerability characteristics of CNNs.
Instead of simply approaching a CNN as a single, large
computational block, we explore its vulnerability at finer
granularities (i.e., neurons, feature maps, and layers). We hy-
pothesize that not all sub-components of a CNN contribute
equally to the overall network vulnerability, and develop
methodologies to quantify vulnerability at a finer granu-
larity. Our results show that errors in some feature maps
or layers are more likely to corrupt the output of a CNN.
Furthermore, we recognize that feature maps are robust
to translation effects in the input, maintaining higher-level
information required by the CNN for inference, while a
technique that operates at neuron-level will not have this
benefit. Based on this advantage and the fact that we can
compose the vulnerability estimates at layer or network level
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using fmap-level analysis, we focus on feature map-level
granularity in this work.
One technique commonly used to quantify an application’s
vulnerability to transient errors is error injection experi-
ments. An exhaustive study, where one error simulation
is performed for a possible hardware error in an applica-
tion state to quantify the effect on the output, is often in-
tractable. Instead, resilience analyses typically employ a
statistical technique to limit the number of error simulation
runs, while preserving the quality of results. We leverage a
similar approach to quantify the vulnerability of a CNN’s
component when subjected to various transient error models
by analyzing the likelihood of a Top-1 misclassification for
(classification) models.
In an error injection run, the output of a CNN can be cor-
rupted but the classification might still be correct. To cap-
ture the severity of output corruption in each injection run,
we propose using an alternate metric that uses the average
change in cross entropy loss (∆loss). We find that capturing
the fine-grain severity metric (instead of binary classification
result) can produce vulnerability estimates that are compa-
rable whether the classification changes, but several times
faster (e.g., 10× for ResNet50). For an additionally faster
method, we explore six heuristics that do not perform error
injections to estimate vulnerability. We leverage activation
values and gradient information during inference and back
propagation. These heuristics provide an additional tradeoff
between accuracy and speed for vulnerability assessment.
We also study the tradeoff between resilience improvement
and increase in computation for added resilience offered by
protecting highly vulnerable feature maps. Results show
that a fraction of feature maps typically account for a dis-
proportionately large percentage of output corruptions (on
average, 30% of feature maps account for 76% of output
corruptions for the studied CNNs). Since each feature map
is a convolution of the input based on an given filter, a low-
cost mitigation technique can be selective filter (or feature
map) duplication.
In summary, this paper presents HarDNN, a highly tunable
technique to identify and harden the most vulnerable com-
ponents of a CNN for hardware-error-resilient inferences.
The following are the main contributions.
• We compare various granularities for protection to
avoid full CNN duplication. We identify that feature
maps (fmaps) provide a ”sweet spot” for their robust-
ness to translation effects of inputs, and their compos-
ability for high-level (e.g., layer-level) protection.
• We study the sensitivity of error models on the contri-
bution of a fmap towards the total vulnerability, which
we call relative vulnerability. Results show that the
relative vulnerabilities of fmaps do not change much
with the studied error models.
• We introduce ∆loss as an accurate metric to measure
vulnerability. ∆loss captures fine-grain perturbations
in inference output and converges to the relative vul-
nerability estimate per fmap with far fewer injections
compared to the baseline classification-based criterion.
• We evaluate multiple non-injection based heuristics for
vulnerability estimation, and compare their accuracy
and speed to ∆loss.
• We study the tradeoff between resilience improvement
and increase in computation for the resilience offered
by protecting highly vulnerable fmaps. Results show
that HarDNN improves resilience of SqueezeNet, for
example, by 10× with just 30% additional computa-
tions.
2 BACKGROUND
2.1 Resiliency
There are two main approaches for resiliency analysis: sta-
tistical error injection and analytical error propagation
modeling. Error injection emulates a hardware error by
perturbing internal program state, and then executing the
program to completion to evaluate the effect of the error (Lu
et al., 2015; Hari et al., 2017; Chang et al., 2018; Venkata-
giri et al., 2016; Mahmoud et al., 2019; Fang et al., 2016;
Schirmeier et al., 2015; Kaliorakis et al., 2017; Hari et al.,
2012; Li et al., 2007; Sridharan & Kaeli, 2009). Because
a program can consist of billions of operations and there
are a plurality of errors possible for each operation, an error
injection campaign can take a large amount of time and
resources to completely characterize the resilience of an
application.
Analytical error models attempt to reduce the resource in-
tensity of error injection by estimating the vulnerability of
different operations through higher-level models that take
into account architecture or domain knowledge (Feng et al.,
2010; Laguna et al., 2016; Li et al., 2018). In this paper,
we investigate both of these resiliency analysis approaches
for CNNs through injection-based and non-injection-based
feature map vulnerability assessment schemes.
2.2 CNN Background
The most fundamental computational unit in a CNN is a
neuron (or activation value). A neuron is the result of a dot
product between a filter and an equal sized portion of the
input. An output feature map (or fmap for short) is a plane
of many neurons, and is obtained by convolving a filter over
an input fmap. Mathematically, a convolution is comprised
of many dot products, where each dot product is composed
of many multiply-and-accumulate (MAC) operations.
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Figure 1. HarDNN overview. Given a pre-trained model, HarDNN (1) targets a specific granularity for resilience analysis, (2) estimates the
relative vulnerability of the components at the chosen granularity, and (3) enables selective protection of the most vulnerable components
before model deployment for optimized (real-time) inference.
A CNN is hierarchically composed of many convolutional
layers, which are themselves formed of many filters. Dur-
ing an inference, filters are convolved with input fmaps to
produce output fmaps, where the number of output fmaps
correspond 1-to-1 with the number of filters in the layer. A
CNN consists of a series of convolutional layers followed by
some fully-connected layers. The final layer in the network
is typically a softmax layer, which provides a probability
distribution for each possible classification the network is
trained to predict. The class with the highest probability
(the Top-1 class) is the chosen prediction of the network
during an inference.
3 HARDNN: DESIGN OVERVIEW
HarDNN is a software-directed resiliency analysis tech-
nique which identifies and selectively hardens vulnerable
computations of CNN inferences. HarDNN takes as input
a pre-trained model, estimates the relative vulnerability at
a target granularity, and hardens the network before de-
ployment using a chosen selective protection method (e.g.,
low-level duplication) by protecting the most vulnerable
components. Effectively, HarDNN transforms the original
CNN model into a transient hardware-error-resilient model
without any loss of classification accuracy. Figure 1 depicts
the high-level overview of HarDNN.
In order to effectively analyze and protect a CNN from
errors, there are three fundamental questions that need to
be addressed: (1) At what granularity (i.e., neurons, feature
maps, layers) should the hardening focus on? (2) Which
subset of the target granularity need duplication? (3) How
should the selective protection be implemented? The rest of
this section addresses these questions.
3.1 Target Granularity
As described in Section 2.2, a CNN is composed in a hi-
erarchical manner with neurons, feature maps, and layers
building up to a full network. While full network duplication
provides high resilience, it can incur 2× runtime or power
overheads and lowers the throughput offered by the sys-
tem by half. Such high overheads are often prohibitive for
safety-critical systems that demand high compute through-
put and resilience. Moreover, full duplication might provide
unnecessary over-protection, as it is does not consider the
contribution of different subcomponents on the total system
reliability. Targeting finer granularities for duplication al-
lows for effectively allocating resources for reliability, rather
than indiscriminate redundancy in time or space. However,
it is critical that the target granularity also effectively mea-
sures vulnerability. For example, although neuron-level
resiliency analysis may provide the most fine-grained con-
trol for selective hardening, this level of granularity suffers
from a fundamental issue that the neurons are not immune to
translational effects of the input image. Changes to the im-
age orientation or scaled images can affect the vulnerability
contribution of a neuron.
Fmaps, on the other hand, do not suffer from this issue.
As long as the CNN is trained to correctly infer images
with such variations in the input (as is typical in training
highly accurate networks), the same fmap is expected to be
important for similar images. Hence, HarDNN focuses on
quantifying vulnerability and hardening at the fmap level. A
benefit of targeting the fmap-level is that the results can be
composed to perform layer- and network-level vulnerability
analysis.
3.2 Vulnerability Estimation
Vulnerability of a fmap is defined as the probability of the
model’s output corruption given a transient hardware error
during an inference. We refer to this quantity as Vfmap.
We can estimate Vfmap in two steps using Equation 1. The
first step estimates the probability of an error manifestation
at the fmap level, given a transient hardware error and the
second step estimates the probability of error propagation
of the fmap corruption to the output of the CNN. We refer
to these two quantities as origination probability or OrigP
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and propagation probability or PropP , respectively.
Vfmap = OriginP × PropP (1)
OrigP depends on the implementation of the convolution
and architecture on which it is being run. Assuming that the
major storage structures are protected in the target hardware
platform, most of the errors originate from the unprotected
computations. Given that MAC operations are used to per-
form a convolution and produce an fmap, we assume that the
origination probability is directly proportional to the number
of MACs in a convolution, without loss in generality. In
this work, we compute OrigP as a fraction of the number
of MACs in a convolution to the number of MACs in the
entire CNN. Refining this quantity based on the hardware
platform and implementation optimizations is part of our
future work.
PropP depends on how the low-level hardware error man-
ifests at the fmap-level and how this manifestation prop-
agates through the network to the output. Considering a
computation-based error model, we assume that an error
in a MAC will corrupt a single neuron’s output in a fmap.
We estimate the probability of single neuron corruptions
propagating to the CNN’s output using two classes of tech-
niques – injection- and non-injection-based. The first class
aims to obtain high accuracy vulnerability estimates. The
second class aims to estimate the vulnerability fast with
zero error injections. We describe the techniques in detail
in Section 4. We also study the sensitivity of using differ-
ent neuron-level error manifestation models on PropP , as
described in Section 5.1.
Once we obtain Vfmap using Equation 1, we can estimate
the total vulnerability of a CNN model, VCNN , using Equa-
tion 2, where N is the total number of fmaps in a CNN.
VCNN =
N∑
i
Vfmapi (2)
HarDNN aims to estimate the relative vulnerability of each
of the fmaps in a CNN (i.e., the contribution of a fmap to-
wards the total CNN vulnerability) to address which fmaps
are the most vulnerable and require protection. The quo-
tients of Equations 1 and 2 can be used to measure this
quantity for an fmap, as shown in Equation 3.
RelVfmapi = Vfmapi/VCNN (3)
3.3 Selective Protection
Once the relative vulnerabilities of feature maps are gath-
ered, HarDNN employs selective duplication to harden the
computations of the most vulnerable feature maps. HarDNN
addresses the how of selective protection by assuming that
the filters which correspond to the highly vulnerable fmaps
can be duplicated. Filter duplication results in two copies
of the same logical fmap, where any mismatches between
the two copies are used to detect errors during inference
and trigger a higher-level system response. The duplicated
fmaps need to be dropped before the inference proceeds to
the next layer. The comparison of the two duplicate feature
maps can be performed lazily to remove it from the critical
path, allowing subsequent layer execution to proceed before
the output is verified. HarDNN’s highly tunable software-
directed selective protection approach allows the designer
to control the resiliency versus overhead trade-off based on
the varying resiliency requirements of the system.
4 HARDNN VULNERABILITY
ESTIMATION TECHNIQUES
Accurately measuring PropP exhaustively would require ob-
serving every possible error in every MAC unit of an fmap,
and aggregating the observed error propogation outcome for
each error per famp. This is infeasible, due to the intractably
large number of possible error sites. Instead, we use statis-
tical error injections to accurately obtain the vulnerability
of fmaps (Section 4.1). Although tractable, this may still
be slow since statistical significance might require a large
number of error injections. Section 4.1.2 introduces ∆loss
as an injection-based metric which can relatively quickly
converges to estimate vulnerability. We then study how
non-injection based heuristics can approximate injection-
based vulnerability in terms of accuracy, but with much less
runtime (Section 4.2). Table 1 summarizes all HarDNN
techniques explored for estimating fmap vulnerability.
4.1 Injection-Based Vulnerability Quantification
The first two metrics used for assessing vulnerability of an
fmap are based on injecting an error into a CNN during infer-
ence, and comparing the outcome of the injection execution
with the error-free execution outcome. The first metric is a
binary observation of whether the injection resulted in an
output misclassification (compared to the golden, error free
inference); this is referred to as a mismatch. The second
metric uses the average delta cross-entropy loss (∆loss for
shorthand) to measure the vulnerability of an error injection.
4.1.1 Mismatches
We quantify PropP of a specific fmap as the fraction of
injections that result in a classification mismatch over all
error injections performed on the fmap. An injection run is
categorized as a mismatch if the network misclassifies the
input image, as compared to the reference label of the image
provided by the dataset. This is analogous to the Top-1
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accuracy metric typically used in machine learning to assess
a neural network’s accuracy. Error injections that do not
alter the Top-1 classification are considered masked, as their
manifestation does not change the expected classification of
the network.
We deem the mismatch metric to be the most accurate from a
resiliency standpoint for computing a fmaps’s vulnerability,
since the Top-1 category is typically used to interpret the
classification of an input image in an application. Thus,
mismatch forms our “oracle” metric, which we use to assess
the accuracy of all other metrics’ relative fmap vulnerability.
4.1.2 ∆Loss: Average Delta Cross Entropy Loss
Although measuring relative vulnerability using mismatches
is the gold standard for image classification networks, one
primary drawback is that mismatches are relatively rare.
Thus, it may take too many injections to obtain fine-grained
differences between fmap vulnerabilities. A primary insight
in this work is to replace the binary view of error propaga-
tion (represented by mismatch) with a continuous view. To
that end, we motivate using the average delta cross entropy
loss for vulnerability estimation.
Cross entropy loss is typically used to train DNNs during
backpropogation to improve the prediction accuracy of the
network. More generally, it is used in information theory
to measure the entropy between two distributions, the true
distribution and the estimated distribution, by penalizing
low confidence in predictions as well as wrong predictions.
Adapting cross-entropy loss to reliability, we calculate the
absolute difference between the cross entropy loss observed
during an error-free inference, and the cross entropy loss
observed during an error-injected inference. This can be
expressed as:
∆Lfmap =
∑N
i | (Lgolden − Li) |
N
(4)
where L is the cross-entropy loss for an inference, (Li is an
error-injected inference, and Lgolden represents the golden
loss for an error-free inference) across N total error injec-
tions. We use the absolute difference of the loss values to
capture the magnitude of the relative loss observed due to
an error injection as a measure of the vulnerability. The
larger the ∆loss, the more vulnerable the fmap is estimated
to be.
4.2 Non-Injection Based Heuristics
Non-error injection based heuristics present alternative
methods to estimate vulnerability which can be gathered rel-
atively quickly compared to error injections. These methods
rely on information from a set of error-free inferences to es-
timate the vulnerability of an fmap. Our non-injection based
heuristics fall under two general categories: (1) obtaining
Table 1. Vulnerability Estimation Techniques
Injection
Name Based? Brief Description
Mismatch Yes Top-1 Misclassification due to error in fmap
∆Loss Yes Average delta cross entropy loss of fmap
MaxNeuron No Max neuron value observe for fmap
FmapRange No Range of neuron values observed for fmap
L2 No Average L2-norm value of fmap
Gradient No Average magnitude of gradients for fmap
Gain No Analytical model of Top-1 class change
for variation in fmap (Sakr & Shanbhag, 2018)
Mod Gain No Alternative formulation of Gain analytical model
fmap-level information using observations from the forward
pass during an inference, and (2) performing an additional
backward pass (a back-propagation) to provide additional
information via differentiation for vulnerability estimation.
We study a total of 6 non-injection based heuristics.
Max Neuron Value: This simple forward-pass technique
assigns an fmap the value of the maximal observed neu-
ron value across many sample inputs. Thus, effectively, it
assumes that errors in feature maps where the activation
values can be high are more likely to affect the outcome.
Feature Map Range: This technique assigns each fmap the
value computed by finding the difference between the largest
and smallest activation value across many sample inputs.
This ranking scheme takes into consideration that networks
will typically be quantized before deployment (Sakr et al.,
2018; 2017; Sakr & Shanbhag, 2018), constraining their
dynamic range and, in effect, also reducing the possible
observable corruptions in the neurons in the feature maps.
Thus, it models the maximal range of error values which
may be observed during inference.
Average L2 The L2-norm calculates the distance of the vec-
tor coordinate from the origin of the vector space. Specif-
ically, it is calculated as the square root of the sum of the
squared vector values. We compute the L2-norm of an fmap
(vector) averaged across multiple input samples to assign
this value to the fmap as an estimate of relative vulnerability.
Gradient One of the key components of CNN training is
the gradient descent algorithm used to update a network’s
weights. During training, a CNN performs back-propagation
to adjust weights in order to minimize a loss function (a typ-
ical loss function is cross-entropy loss, discussed above).
This is done by obtaining the gradient value at each weight,
and adjusting the weights incrementally during each train-
ing epoch by using the gradient value. We use a similar
technique but adapted to neurons (rather than weights). As
neurons are differentiable, they too have gradient values
which can be used to predict vulnerability. For this tech-
nique, we perform a backward pass which only computes
the gradients for each neuron and does not modify the net-
work parameters, unlike the backward pass used in the train-
ing phase. We compute the gradients with respect to the
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cross-entropy loss at the output. We use the absolute value
of neuron gradients obtained, and average them per fmap
across many samples from the dataset.
Gain Recent work by Sakr et al. (Sakr et al., 2017; Sakr
& Shanbhag, 2018) proposed an analytical model which
bounds mismatch probability pm in the context of network
quantization. The analysis is based on estimating how much
a noise source, at a set of neurons for instance, affects the
accuracy of a network. If a set of neurons A is corrupted
element-wise by a noise source of variance σ2n then:
pm ≤ σ2nE
 M∑
i=1,i6=yˆ
∑
a∈A |∂ (zi − zyˆ) /∂(a)|2
|zi − zyˆ|2

(5)
where σ2(na) is the variance of the noise source, yˆ is the
label predicted by the noise-free network, {zi}Mi=1 are that
soft outputs, M is the number of classes.
The set of neurons A can be defined in a flexible manner
and could denote anything from all of the neurons in the
network, or the set of neurons in a given layer, and most
relevantly, the set of neurons within an fmap. Thus, we
define the noise gain of an fmap F as
EF = E
 M∑
i=1,i6=yˆ
∑
a∈F |∂ (zi − zyˆ) /∂(a)|2
|zi − zyˆ|2
 (6)
where, from (5), we have
pm ≤ σ2nEF (7)
The expectation in (6) can be obtained by taking averages
over the training set or even a subset of it with statistically
significant size as discussed in (Sakr et al., 2017). Fur-
thermore, computing the noise gain in (6) requires deriva-
tives of outputs with respect to neurons, which are readily
available thanks to the automatic differentiation packages
utilized by deep learning frameworks implementing the
back-propagation algorithm. In addition, (6) assumes a pre-
trained network with frozen parameters and need only be
computed once for all fmaps.
Thus, a natural mechanism for fmap vulnerability estimation
is simply to measure their noise gains. Indeed, if an fmap
F has a large noise gain EF , then (7) shows that corrupting
F with noise will have a large impact on pm. On the other
hand, if EF is small, then corrupting F with noise will have
a small impact on pm. In our results, this ranking procedure
is referred to as Gain.
Modified Gain The analytical results of Gain are derived as-
suming corruption of neurons by independent noise sources.
In our work, we also consider the case where a neuron is
replaced by a random scalar belonging to the fmap’s dy-
namic range as discussed later in Section 5.1. Such setup
violates the independence assumption between neuron and
noise. However, we may still leverage the above theory.
Indeed, it can be shown that (7) still applies in the context
of neuron replacement provided the definition of the noise
gain is updated as follows:
EF = E
 M∑
i=1,i6=yˆ
∑
a∈F a
2
∣∣∣∂(zi−zyˆ)∂(a) ∣∣∣2
|zi − zyˆ|2
 (8)
This analysis yields a homologous technique to Gain which
we refer to as Mod-Gain in our evaluation.
5 EVALUATION METHODOLOGY
We evaluate HarDNN on 11 CNNs across three datasets.
Table 2 lists each CNN, along with the number of layers,
fmaps, and neurons, and accuracy on the respective dataset.
We use the PyTorch v1.1 framework (Paszke et al., 2017)
for evaluation, and obtained pretrained models for CNNs
trained on ImageNet (Russakovsky et al., 2015) from the Py-
Torch TorchVision repository (PyTorch, 2019), and CNNs
trained on CIFAR10/100 from github (Yang, 2017). All
experiments were run on an Amazon EC2 p3.2xlarge in-
stance (Miller et al., 2010), which has an Intel Xeon E5-
2686 v4 server processor, 64GB of memory, and an NVIDIA
V100 GPU with 16GB of memory (NVIDIA, 2018).
5.1 Error Models
We model neuron-level manifestations of transient hardware
errors that occur during an inference. As described in Sec-
tion 3.2, we assume that a particle strike to a flip-flop used
during a MAC operation during a convolution will corrupt a
single neuron’s value. Such low-level errors can manifest as
single or multiple bit-flips. Additionally, highly optimized
inference systems typically employ quantization prior to
deploying CNNs. Such models run significantly faster with
hardware support for reduced-precision operations, which
is prevalent in GPUs and CPUs. These benefits often come
with a small but acceptable loss in classification accuracy
(reflected in Column 8 of Table 2). Based on these consid-
eration, we evaluate PropP using the following three error
models.
FP-Rand represents a random (possibly multi-bit) error
during the computation of a neuron, where the computations
are performed on floating point values. We model this by
choosing a random neuron in an fmap, and substituting the
original value with a random value between [-max, max],
where max is the maximum observed neuron value in the
fmap across the training set. FP-Rand limits the effect of an
error by bounding it between a range. Previous work found
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Table 2. CNNs studied with key topological parameters and training accuracy.
Neural Dataset Convolutional Total Total Average Floating Point INT8 Quantized
Network Name Layers Feature Maps Neurons Neurons/Fmap Top-1 Accuracy Top-1 Accuracy
ResNet50 ImageNet 53 26,560 11,113,984 418 76.12% 75.79%
MobileNet ImageNet 52 17,056 6,678,112 391 71.87% 62.18%
VGG19 ImageNet 16 5,504 14,852,096 2,698 72.36% 72.20%
GoogleNet ImageNet 57 7,280 3,226,160 443 69.78% 69.43%
ShuffleNet ImageNet 56 8,090 1,950,200 241 69.35% 67.01%
SqueezeNet ImageNet 26 3,944 2,589,352 656 58.18% 57.39%
AlexNet ImageNet 5 1,152 484,992 421 56.52% 56.04%
VGG19 CIFAR10 16 5,504 303,104 55 93.34% 93.38%
AlexNet CIFAR10 5 1,152 10,752 9 77.24% 77.21%
VGG19 CIFAR100 16 5,504 303,104 55 71.94% 71.89%
AlexNet CIFAR100 5 1,152 10,752 9 43.87% 43.82%
Table 3. Runtime analytical models for vulnerability estimation
schemes.
Technique Runtime Estimate
Mismatch samples * forward * fmaps * inj/fmap
∆Loss samples * forward * fmaps * inj/fmap
MaxValue samples * forward
FmapRange samples * forward
Average L2 samples * forward
Gradient samples * (forward + backward)
Gain samples * (forward + (backward * (classes - 1)))
Mod-Gain samples * (forward + (backward * (classes - 1)))
Terminology:
samples: Total number of images used in the ranking set
forward: Average runtime of a single inference for a CNN
backward: Average runtime of a single back-propogation for a CNN
fmaps: Total number of feature maps in a network
inj/fmap: The number of error injection experiments per feature map
classes: The total number of output classes
that inference is highly sensitive to errors in the sign and
exponent bits and a simple output fmap-level range detector
can mitigate many of the most severe corruptions (Li et al.,
2017).
FxP-Rand considers 8-bit integer (INT8) fixed-point quan-
tization, which quantizes the CNN based on the range of
neuron values observed during training. Error injections
are performed by choosing a random neuron from an fmap,
and substituting the original value with a randomly selected
INT8 value. Thus, FxP-Rand is similar to FP-Rand, but for
quantized models.
FxP-Flip models the effect of a single bit-flip on a fixed-
point quantized neuron, simulating the effect of a particle
strike on a flip-flop storing the neuron’s output.
5.2 Evaluating Vulnerability Estimation Techniques
For vulnerability analysis, we exclude images that are incor-
rectly classified by the error-free network since our focus is
on analyzing the resilience of the network during correct ex-
ecution. After removing incorrectly classified images from
the dataset, we randomize and partition the correctly classi-
fied images into two non-overlapping subsets: an estimation
set (ES) and a test set (TS), using an 80-20 split. We use
the TS to perform error injections and generate baseline vul-
nerability estimations using the mismatch- and ∆loss-based
metrics. The ES is used on all metrics (including mismatch
and ∆loss), to compare the fmap vulnerability estimates to
the TS.
To quantitatively compare two metrics, we sort the fmaps
from most to least vulnerable by the respective metric. We
compute the cumulative vulnerability of the fmaps in this
sorted order. This gives us a cumulative vulnerability vs.
fmap curve for a given metric, from which we can compute
Manhattan distance between the two curves for each fmap
point. We use the average Manhattan distance as a measure
of the difference between the metrics, where a distance close
to zero indicates very high correlation.
5.3 Error Coverage vs. Computational Overhead
For a given set of feature maps, F, that are duplicated, we
define coverage as the cumulative relative vulnerability of
those fmaps. From a developers point of view, depending on
the metric used, this coverage is the cumulative vulnerability
estimate given by that metric on the test set. We refer to this
as the predicted coverage. The actual coverage on the eval-
uation set, however, could be different. We experimentally
measure this coverage by determining the coverage of F on
the test set using the loss metric. We validate the predicted
coverage against the actual coverage to see how similar they
are.
To target a specific coverage value, we use a greedy algo-
rithm. We sort all fmaps from higher to lower vulnerability
(based on the metric being considered) and choose the first
several fmaps whose relative vulnerability adds up to the
targeted coverage. To assess the relative overhead tradeoff,
we measure the total number of MAC operations in those
selected fmaps as a fraction of the total MAC operations in
all fmaps. We use MACs as a reasonable proxy to the actual
overhead, while providing some abstraction for the actual
hardware used.
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Figure 2. Relative vulnerability of fmaps is similar across error
models, even with different VCNN (AlexNet-ImageNet)
Table 4. Manhattan Distance between Relative Vulnerability of
FP-Rand and FxP-Flip
Network-Dataset Distance
ResNet50-ImageNet 0.71× 10−5
MobileNet-ImageNet 1.65× 10−5
VGG19-ImageNet 3.95× 10−5
GoogleNet-ImageNet 2.18× 10−5
ShuffleNet-ImageNet 3.35× 10−5
SqueezeNet-ImageNet 7.76× 10−5
AlexNet-ImageNet 2.99× 10−5
5.4 Heuristic Analysis
One of the primary motives of using heuristics is to esti-
mate vulnerability much faster compared to error injections.
We provide analytical models to compare the different ex-
pected runtimes of each vulnerability estimation technique
in Table 3. The analytical models predict the runtime based
on the the number of samples explored, runtime of a for-
ward/backward pass, and the number of inj/fmap (for the
injection-based techniques). The forward-pass-based heuris-
tics (MaxValue, FmapRange, AverageL2) are expected to
perform the fastest, followed by the backprop-based heuris-
tics (gradient, gain, mod-gain), and the slowest are injection-
based techniques. In practice, most of these schemes can be
parallelized via batching multiple images together on a sin-
gle device and across multiple devices, which can provide
additional speedups (not included in the model).
To assess the accuracy of the heuristics, i.e., how well
they estimate relative vulnerabilities of fmaps, we com-
pare the cumulative vulnerability estimates of each heuris-
tic on the ES, and measure the Manhattan distance to an
error-injection estimation provided by the TS. Section 5.3
provides additional detail on quantitatively comparing the
accuracy of a heuristic.
6 RESULTS
6.1 Error Models Comparison
We begin our evaluation by comparing the relative vulner-
abilities of fmaps across different error models. Figure 2
shows the cumulative relative vulnerability of the fmaps in
AlexNet-ImageNet, where the x-axis is sorted in descending
order of relative vulnerability as measured by the oracle
mismatch metric using 12,288 injections per fmap (short-
hand: inj/fmap). We use the same ordering on the x-axis
(based on FxP-Flip vulnerability ordering) for comparison,
and normalize the relative vulnerabilities of fmaps to its
respective error model.
Comparing relative vulnerabilities of fmaps show that, re-
gardless of error model, an fmap’s contribution towards
the total network vulnerability is nearly the same, with the
average Manhattan distance between the different errors
models for AlexNet at 2.4×10−5. Further, we find that this
occurs despite the fact that the absolute total vulnerability,
VCNN , differs for different models. FP-Rand and FxP-Rand
show similar VCNN , since both error models have the same
dynamic range and multi-bit perturbation probabilities. FxP-
Flip shows lower VCNN , attributed to the less egregious
error model of a single-bit perturbation. We find that the
relative vulnerabilities of fmaps are nearly same for differ-
ent networks for FP-Rand and FxP-Flip. Table 4 shows the
distances between the results for the two error models for
different CNNs are small, despite FxP-Flip displaying fewer
errors overall compared to FP-Rand. Given that the relative
vulnerability contribution of fmaps is similar across error
models, we focus the remainder analysis of this paper on
FxP-Flip.
6.2 Mismatch vs. Loss
We next evaluate the efficacy of using loss-based vulnerabil-
ity estimation in place of the mismatch metric to measure
relative vulnerability. Using AlexNet as a case study, we
perform a large injection campaign sweeping the number
of injections per fmap from 64 to 12288, and measure rel-
ative fmap vulnerability using both mismatch and ∆loss.
We compare the relative vulnerability at each point to the
Oracle vulnerability defined as mismatch at 12,288 inj/fmap,
and compute the Manhattan distance between the cumula-
tive relative vulnerabilities. Figure 3a shows the result for
AlexNet across different datasets, and Figure 3b shows the
result for all ImageNet networks with ∆loss compared to
Mismatches up to 2048 inj/fmap.
Although the mismatch metric may be considered the gold
standard for CNN reliability analysis, we find that ∆loss and
mismatch both converge as the total number of injections
per fmap increase. Larger models, such as AlexNet trained
for ImageNet rather than CIFAR, take longer to converge for
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(a) At large inj/fmap, mismatch and loss converge to provide
similar fmap vulnerability estimates (AlexNet). Loss con-
verges faster.
(b) Loss converges to vulnerability estimates with relatively
few inj/fmap (across CNNs)
Figure 3. Convergence of mismatch and loss
mismatch and start much further away from the final result
(Manhattan Distance of 0.12). The reason for this is that
the binary nature of the mismatch-based metric (i.e., it must
observe a Top-1 misclassification to differentiate between
fmaps) means that more injections are required as a function
of the larger space of errors. Thus, the more total neurons
in the CNN, the larger the space of possible errors, which in
turn translates to requiring more error injection experiments
if measured by mismatch.
However, ∆loss does not suffer from this phenomenon, as
it incorporates small changes in the output resulting from
an error even if the Top-1 class does not change. In other
words, ∆loss can extract information from Masked errors,
and use that to quickly converge to the fmaps final vul-
nerability estimate. We find this trend across all networks
studied for ImageNet in Figure 3b, where ∆loss asymptoti-
cally approaches its final value quickly (note the log scale
on x-axis). For example, for ResNet50, ∆loss using 256
inj/fmap, the relative vulnerability is a distance of less than
.002 from the relative vulnerability of ∆loss using 2048
inj/fmap, indicating a potential runtime improvement of the
injection campaign by 10× with negligible loss of quality.
As the distance computed in Figure 3b is with respect to
mismatch at 2048, we find that networks with more neu-
rons/fmap such as VGG (see column 6 of Table 2) display a
larger distance between ∆loss and mismatch. This can be
(a) Predicted coverage using∆Loss vulnerability estimate
(b) Validation of predicted coverage vs actual coverage
Figure 4. Error coverage vs computational overhead
Table 5. Experimental Runtimes for Vulnerability Estimation (hrs)
*Implementation required batch size = 1 for Gain/Mod-Gain
Estimation AlexNet- GoogleNet- ResNet50-
Technique ImageNet ImageNet ImageNet
Mismatch-2k 1.25 8.20 35.5
∆Loss-2k 1.25 8.20 35.5
MaxNeuron 0.01 0.01 2.50
FmapRange 0.01 0.01 2.50
Average L2 0.01 0.01 0.02
Gradient 0.01 0.08 2.50
Gain* 0.35 3.50 15.38
Mod-Gain* 0.38 4.50 16.98
attributed to the baseline mismatch metric not yet converg-
ing at 2048 inj/fmap. From Figure 3a, we can expect that
as the mismatch metric approaches many more inj/fmap,
the two will close the gap. Thus, ∆loss is in fact a better
fine-grained proxy at estimating fmap vulnerability, since it
requires fewer inj/fmaps to converge while still maintaining
high accuracy compared to mismatch at higher inj/fmaps.
6.3 Error Coverage vs. Computational Overhead
HarDNN provides the developer with a technique to esti-
mate vulnerability, and tune for error coverage versus com-
putational overhead. Since the developer may not always
have the true relative vulnerability of each fmap, s/he re-
quires an accurate tool to make an informed decision regard-
ing the coverage vs. overhead tradeoff. Figure 4a depicts this
trade-off, where the x-axis shows the relative vulnerability
estimates using ∆loss, and the corresponding additional per-
centage of MAC units required to obtain the corresponding
coverage. The coverage here is measured using the PropP
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(a) ResNet50-ImageNet
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(b) MobileNet-ImageNet
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Figure 5. Relative vulnerability computed for each heuristic on the ES, compared to baseline relative vulnerability of ∆loss from the
TS. Y-axis shows the cumulative sum of of relative vulnerability as obtained by the mismatch on TS. The Manhattan distance between
Baseline and a vulnerability estimation technique indicates the accuracy of the method, where shorter distance is better.
value of ∆loss from the ES for vulnerability estimation, as
a prediction of actual coverage which is provided by the
mismatch metric from the TS.
Based on this view, we find that the computational overhead
is always sub-linear to coverage, indicating that selective
protection is in fact advantageous to full duplication, and
can even provide large benefits. For example, covering 90%
of errors in SqueezeNet requires less than 30% additional
MACs. Even for networks which don’t display such a large
advantage as SqueezeNet, all networks do exhibit the sublin-
ear behavior of coverage to overhead. The reasoning behind
this is that the most vulnerably fmaps have a high PropP
and/or a high OriginP. For networks which have less uniform
fmap size distributions, such as SqueezeNet, MobileNet, and
ShuffleNet, we find a knee at the end of the curve which
captures large features (OriginP) with low PropP. Other net-
works which do not have such a large discrepancy between
fmaps across layers show relative vulnerability with a less
pronounced trade-off between coverage and overhead.
We compare the predicted coverage by ∆loss to the actual
coverage in Figure 4b (as described in Section 5.3), and we
find that, not only is ∆loss relatively quick at vulnerabil-
ity estimation (from Section 6.2), it is also representative
of the actual vulnerability as measured by mismatches in
the TS. Thus, the prediction provided to the developer is
very accurate, with ∆loss providing an excellent proxy for
error coverage. This goes back to the fact that ∆loss val-
ues actually capture the sensitivity of the network, and the
mismatch-based metric is a specific by-product of how sen-
sitive an fmap is to errors.
6.4 Heuristic Analysis
Last but not least, we evaluate the accuracy and runtime of
all heuristics, measured against the vulnerability estimate
of ∆loss as a baseline since ∆loss experimentally proves
to be a superior metric to mismatches. Figure 5 shows the
heuristic results for different CNNs, where the x-axis is
ordered based on the relative vulnerability estimate for each
respective heuristic using the ES, and the baseline for ∆loss
is provided by the TS. The relative vulnerability is obtained
for each heuristic by extracting the PropP of each Fmap
from the mismatch-based TS, and the cumulative sum is
shown on the y-axis. Table 5 shows the measured runtimes
for all the techniques on our evaluation infrastructure.
We find that ∆Loss is the highest performing metric (aver-
age distance of .004 from baseline) followed by mismatch
(average distance = .006), both from the ES. This validates
that the error injection techniques have high accuracy rela-
tive to the TS. The non-injection based techniques however
vary widely, but we find that the techniques which lever-
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age backprop are generally more accurate, with Gradient
performing the best overall (average distance = .067). This
result follows from the fact that the magnitude of the gra-
dient helps inform the overall sensitivity of the fmap to a
perturbation; a gradient of zero means the fmap is very sta-
ble, and won’t change too much, translating to a smaller
effect on the output. Larger gradients on the other hand
may play a stronger role in the final classification for an
image, and as such the backprop-based metrics leverage this
information.
One additional insight we find is that on average, a small
number of fmaps (less than a third) account for a large
percentage of the networks relative vulnerability (average
of 76% cumulative vulnerability). However, this does not
directly map to the overhead associated with the highly
vulnerable feature maps (as it doesn’t take into account the
size of the fmap, just the number of fmaps) but indicates
that without incorporating OrigP, the relative vulnerability
of fmaps may be biased.
For runtime analysis of the heuristics, we leveraged image
batching when available, and still found that the runtime
trends between the analytical models (Section 5.4) and the
measure runtimes to be similar. However, gain and mod-
gain underperformed due to an implementation limitation,
where the backprop algorithm did not support for batch-
ing with different differentiation values as required by the
gain formulation. Overall, ∆loss provides the highest ac-
curacy and be sped up with fewer inj/fmap, while gradient
provides an acceptable trade-off between runtime and accu-
racy, which can be used for quick profiling by the developer
during vulnerability estimation.
7 RELATED WORK
Pruning Based Techniques: CNN model pruning tech-
niques aim to remove redundant and less-useful parameters
from a model to improve execution efficiency (Cun et al.,
1990). These techniques often reduce accuracy by a few
small factors. HarDNN focuses on identifying vulnerable
feature maps, which it then proceeds to duplicate to improve
reliability, with no effect on classification accuracy. There
are many similarities between pruning and hardening. (1)
Pruning is typically a two-phased process. The first phase
identifies a filter to remove, and the second phase (called
a fine-tuning phase) removes the filter and retrains the net-
work. (2) Recent work found that pruning full filters (rather
than individual weights in a filter) can have minimal effects
on accuracy, while improving the pruning speed (Li et al.,
2016). This is analogous to our fmap target granularity and
protection strategy. (3) Pruning techniques rank filters using
heuristics to identify candidates to prune (Li et al., 2016;
Molchanov et al., 2016). We also explore similar heuristics
to estimate fmaps based on vulnerability. The objective
of a pruning technique is to zero-out a filter, removing it
from the model. In contrast, for the resiliency analysis, we
assume various error models which change a single neuron.
DNN Reliability: Recent work has explored DNN-specific
reliability due to rise of DNN usage in safetly-critical ap-
plications. Previous methods targeted neuron-level (Schorn
et al., 2018) vulnerability but more recently have also grav-
itated toward fmap-level analysis (Schorn et al., 2019).
HarDNN differs from Schorn et al. in that their focus is
on redistributing error across a CNN, whereas HarDNN
aims to provide selective protection of the vulnerable fmaps.
BinFI (Chen et al., 2019) proposes an orthogonal binary
search technique to reduce the error injection space for ML
reliability, which can be generally used to speed up error
injection campaigns. We introduce ∆loss as a different met-
ric for measuring vulnerability, which, as shown, can also
speed up injection campaigns.
8 CONCLUSION
This paper presents HarDNN, a software-directed technique
to identify vulnerable computations in CNNs and selec-
tively protect them. HarDNN operates at the feature map
level granularity, and introduces ∆loss as an accurate error-
injection based metric for vulnerability estimation, and ex-
plores different heuristics for fast vulnerability assessment.
Additionally, we analyze the tradeoff between error cov-
erage and computation overhead for selective protection.
Results show that the relative vulnerability of an fmap is sim-
ilar across 3 error models studied, and that the improvement
in resilience for the added computation is super linear with
HarDNN. For example, HarDNN can improve SqueezeNet’s
resilience by 10× with just 30% computational overhead.
For future work we plan to extend HarDNN to include other
applications of neural networks.
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